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This dissertation uses a game-theoretic approach to discuss positive and nor-
mative issues of economic reform in liberalyzing countries. Chapter 1 presents the
approach followed and overviews the issues discussed in the following chapters.
Stabilization (and generally speaking economic reform) is often delayed, at the
price of increasing pains. Chapter 2 explains this observation by considering the
government actions as the outcome of an ongoing conﬂict among interest groups or
“political parties.” When each “party” favors a diﬀerent reform program and one
of the two has to concede for a program to be adopted, a war of attrition is likely
to emerge if the parties involved have private information about how much they
care about the reform. Unlike Alesina and Drazen (1991) seminal paper on delay
of stabilization, uncertainty about the expected costs of reform is introduced, and
asymmetric equilibria are explored.
In recent experiences of economic reform in Eastern Europe and Latin America,
comprehensive and swift introduction of reforms seems to have lead to (presum-
ably) larger than necessary adjustment costs. Chapter 3 purports to explain these
observations within a political-economic framework. Once political sustainability
ixconsiderations are incorporated into the problem faced by policymakers, the opti-
mal course of action may very well diﬀer from the one that could be inferred from
an “unconstrained” economic perspective.
Finally, Chapter 4 concentrates on the diﬃculties surrounding the process of
opening credit markets, as a result of pervasive informational problems in the
aftermath of liberalizing reforms. Accumulation of information capital is likely
to be costly. (In the example presented, it requires to accept a large number of
defaults when the market opens.) This could be part of the explanation of the
recessive tendencies following large-scale economic transformations.
xChapter 1
Overview
The ﬁrst part of these dissertation, comprised of chapters 2 and 3, uses a political-
economic approach to economic reform issues. The term political economy refers
to what has been called “new political economy” or “neoclassical political econ-
omy,” which includes work done over the last decades under diﬀerent names such
as public choice or rent-seeking. Essentially, this approach is characterized by the
application of common standards of analytical rigor to both economic and political
behavior. Both in the economic and in the political sphere, agents are assumed to
maximize welfare as they conceive it. Their behavior is assumed to be forward-
looking and consistent, although they learn from past observations. Largely, then,
the term political economy refers to the application of the economic method to a
larger set of issues.
When applied to economic policy issues, this approach focuses not only on what
policymakers should do if they were benevolent planners; it also tries to explain
why policymakers do what they do. In doing so, it emphasizes the existence of
credibility constraints and political constraints on the policymakers’ optimization
problem. Political constraints are originated in the fact that policymakers are
restricted in their choices by the actions of other political actors. Credibility
constraints are given by the fact that the public knows (even if imperfectly) that
1the government pursues some objectives and that it does so subject to political
and other constraints. It is important to notice that credibility constraints would
arise even in the absence of divergent objectives between the diﬀerent members
of society, while political constraints can only be binding if political agents have
conﬂicting objectives.
The experience of developing countries and former socialist countries with
market-oriented reforms oﬀers some salient topics for research under this approach.
Questions about the rejection, delay, or reversal of welfare-improving reforms or
its adoption in a economically suboptimal fashion have already motivated several
recent papers (see the survey by Rodrik 1993). The varied fortune of countries
experimenting with these reforms has made it clear that an understanding of the
forces governing policymaking is necessary in order to devise policies with hope
of success.
While the political economic literature in general postulates a framework of
political institutions corresponding to that of the developed nations, approach-
ing economic reform issues entails to recognize the peculiar political conditions
prevalent in the reforming countries. While in the literature at large it is assumed
that voting is the only or the most relevant form of participation with respect to
macroeconomic policy issues (see, e.g., the text by Tabellini and Persson 1990), in
developing countries electoral accountability can be less important as a political
constraint than other forms of political involvement by the members of the pub-
lic, such as lobbying by interest groups, public protests, and even violent actions,
because democratic institutions are less common and tend to be fragile. In some
cases, a veto game in which diﬀerent groups have access to the decision making
process in sets of issues can be a more appropriate representation of the institu-
tional framework than a majority voting game. This has been the type of political
2participation assumed in the next two chapters.
The ﬁrst question addressed in the dissertation is why countries experiencing
economic diﬃculties often delay the adoption of unavoidable reforms even at the
expense of increasing pains, and how these reforms ﬁnally come about. Previous
work has explained this delay as a result of a disagreement between powerful
interest groups about who will end up bearing the cost of these reforms. The
essay “Political Conﬂict and the Timing of Stabilization” (chapter 2) extends this
work by introducing private information about the expected costs of reform to each
group, and proposes some modeling alternatives that could be closer to the actual
experience of delayed reform in recent years, in the sense that they emphasize the
existence of asymmetries in the political conﬂict about stabilization.
The second question addressed is what are the constraints that political fea-
sibility imposes on the design of economic reform, assuming that a government
has the will to go in that direction. The essay “Sequencing of Economic Reforms
in the Presence of Political Constraints” (chapter 3) interprets the apparent bias
toward radical (i.e., comprehensive and speedy) reform in recent episodes as a
by-product of time-consistency problems when the government actions are po-
tentially subject to the veto power of interest groups at each step of the reform
process.This hypothesis has to be contrasted in future work with the competing
hypothesis, advanced in the literature, that the bias towards radical reform is a
result of the need of the government to signal its commitment toward the reform
process in circumstances in which the government faces a credibility problem.
Studying models with more complex forms of political interaction, including
the possibility of negotiation and the transmission of information by means more
eﬃcient than mere delay will certainly illuminate other aspects of the issues raised
by reform.
3The second part of the dissertation, comprised by chapter 4, is concerned
with why are processes of economic transition so costly in terms of lost output
and unemployment. One possible answer is that massive political and economic
transformations dislocate the cooperative agreements that are the basis of orga-
nizational performance of institutions and markets in which private information
is important. Several recent papers have stressed the idea of the importance of
the diﬃculties of the formation of information capital in the aftermath of large-
scale economic reform. However, to the best of my knowledge, no formal paper
has emphasized the role of imperfect information in new credit markets. Private
information is particularly important in credit markets; it will take time for new
credit markets to sort out good from bad borrowers and to foster cooperative be-
havior between potentially good borrowers and lenders. The essay “Reputation
and Credit Terms in New Markets” (Chapter 4) presents a model in which trust
develops slowly between borrowers and lenders, and stakes oﬀered in each round
of transactions behavior rise accordingly. The model is also a metaphor for other
institutions and markets in which trust develops slowly.
4Chapter 2
Political Conﬂict and the Timing
of Stabilization
2.1 Introduction
It has often been observed that countries often delay the adoption of reforms,
incurring in great pains as a result of this. This is true even in the cases in
which reforms could beneﬁt most segments of the society, as is the case in high
inﬂation stabilization. A key to understand this puzzling observation is that gov-
ernment actions are commonly not the result of a single agent rational behavior,
but rather the outcome of ongoing conﬂicts among interest groups or political
movements. Indeed, the importance of distributive conﬂicts in delayed reform
has been commonly stressed, at least in the case of Latin American countries.
What has been lacking is a plausible account of economic mechanisms through
which group politics translate into inﬂation and how political parameters aﬀect
the timing of stabilization. The new political economy literature has started ad-
dressing these issues formally. This chapter develops a politico-economic model
that combines elements from diﬀerent strands of this literature. In the model,
diﬀerent interest groups have private information about their regard for diﬀerent
policy alternatives, and impose delay costs on each other to convey information
5about their willingness to concede. More speciﬁcally, the groups have private in-
formation about how much they fear will be the cost of stabilization for them.
That is, there is uncertainty about the future. This can be due to uncertainty
about the impact of the policy instruments to be employed in the stabilization or
about the duration of the period of transitional costs. The model also lends some
attention to the importance of asymmetries in the conﬂict, say in the current costs
of inﬂation or in the expected costs of stabilization.
The seminal paper by Alesina and Drazen (1991) ﬁrst stresses in the context
of a formal model the importance of private information in a political conﬂict
about inﬂation stabilization. There exist two groups (say, capital and labor), and
each group incurs a rising cost as stabilization is delayed. The group that caves
in ﬁrst will have to assume a larger part of the post-stabilization taxes. The key
feature of their model is that the magnitude of the cost of inﬂation borne by
each group is unknown to the other group. Each group then has an incentive to
wait and see if the other group gives up ﬁrst. Stabilization takes place only when
one of the groups realizes that it has more to gain by assuming the largest share
of stabilization taxes than by waiting another instant to see if its rival does so
instead.1 Others papers such as Drazen and Grilli (1993) and Guidotti and Vegh
(1991) follow essentially the same approach.
A diﬀerent strand of the literature is represented by Fernandez and Rodrik
(1991), who show that it is not enough for a policy action to represent a positive
sum game for it to be undertaken. This is due to risk aversion and uncertainty
about who will end up beneﬁting from the reform, that is, uncertainty about the
post reform period. Although Fernandez and Rodrik are explicitly concerned with
trade reform, their argument applies for the case of any reform such as stabiliza-
1This type of model is known in game theory as a war-of- attrition model with imperfect
information. A classic reference to the war-of-attrition game is Maynard Smith (1982).
6tion. Laban and Sturzenegger (1992) also consider post reform uncertainty, but
they introduce an additional element by considering that one of two groups in
conﬂict has access to a ﬁnancial adaptation technology that reduces for them the
costs of inﬂation.
This model combines elements of those two strands of the politico- economic
literature by introducing uncertainty about the future and potential asymmetries
in the costs of inﬂation and stabilization in the context of a model of delay with
imperfect information. Formally, the model is one of war of attrition such as
the one presented by Alesina and Drazen (1991). Alesina and Drazen focus their
attention on the case in which the groups have identical beliefs about the costs
that delaying stabilization impose on each other, in the spirit of the model of
Bliss and Nalebuﬀ (1984). After ﬁnding a symmetric equilibrium, they are able
to solve for the expected time of stabilization as a function of several political and
economic variables. This is not completely satisfactory because, as emphasized
by other authors, uncertainty seems to be mainly about the costs of stabiliza-
tion itself, and because, in general, rival political groups are not expected to be
similarly aﬀected by pre-stabilization distortions or by the costs of stabilization.
For instance, inﬂation is known to be a regressive tax. Then, ex-ante, political
groups representing in average lower income constituencies are likely to be the
more aﬀected by delaying the stabilization. In a symmetric equilibrium, as shown
by Drazen and Grilli (1990), an increase in the cost of waiting makes political
agreement come sooner. However, in a more general setting, changes in the cost
of waiting for the diﬀerent interest groups could have diﬀerent eﬀects on the delay
of political agreement. We could expect that, if distortions become less costly for
the (apparently) stronger side, political agreement will come sooner because the
weaker side will become more willing to concede. (An example, provided by La-
7ban and Sturzenegger (1992), could be the more extensive use of foreign currency
by one of the two sides, reducing the cost of inﬂation for them.)
To explore these intuitions, I go to an asymmetric version of the war-of-
attrition model. Results due to Fudenberg and Tirole (1986) and Nalebuﬀ and
Riley (1985) allow to derive a plausible equilibrium. The equilibrium obtained
is complicated to manipulate algebraically, and, as have been observed in similar
models, comparative static results are hard to come by. Some results are however
clear. There is in general a positive probability that a political agreement will be
achieved immediately, because the “more pessimistic” party will concede at time
zero with nonnegligible probability. Stabilization will be more likely to be delayed
the more similar are the beliefs that the parties involved have about the costs
that stabilization will impose on each other, and the more similar are the costs of
inﬂation for the two groups.
These results may serve to qualify the assertions of Alesina and Drazen (1991)
and Drazen and Grilli (1990) about the eﬀects of indexation on the likelihood of
a political agreement: If it reduces the cost of inﬂation for the two parties alike,
then both parties become more willing to wage a longer conﬂict, but if one of
the two parties is particularly beneﬁted, then the other may consider conceding
immediately. An empirical question that comes immediately to mind is whether
the extent of indexation has shielded from inﬂation the politically enfranchised
groups more uniformly in Brazil (with an unending story of frustrated stabilization
proposals) than dollarization did it in Bolivia (where stabilization was accompa-
nied by a major political realignment, including the demise of the organized labor
movement).
Out of the completely symmetric case, the model does not lend itself to obtain
an expression for the expected time of stabilization, and the eﬀect of parametric
8changes on this expected time is unclear. For instance, when the share of the new
tax burden that the conceding party will have to assume increases, the probability
of immediate concession increases but, immediately after time zero, both parties
wait longer times to concede. To make more precise statements probably requires
to introduce more structure into the model. After all, the model is pretty abstract:
For instance, it imposes no restrictions on the timing of stabilization. Stabiliza-
tion could occur at any time, or be delayed forever, which is clearly unrealistic.
(Brazilians may disagree, as Argentineans before Menem might have.) In reality,
certain moments, such as the changing of a cabinet, act as focal points to strike
a political agreement; these focal points are of course sensible to institutional
factors. A further lesson of this exercise is that results based on the symmetric
case should not be taken too seriously as the only ones compatible with ratio-
nal behavior. In order to obtain more precise results while considering potential
asymmetries we have to take into account institutional restrictions. The fear of a
forced renewal of the political elite, for instance, could put a deadline to a conﬂict
about stabilization, forcing one of the parties involved to concede before a drastic
change in political conditions, even at the expense of a worsening of economic
conditions for their constituency.
This framework presented is consistent with several common features of stabi-
lization crises: Crises occur in countries experiencing distributive struggle. (For
instance, Europe in the 1920’s or Latin America in the 1980’s.) Things tend to get
worse before decisive actions are taken to stabilize the economy. And stabiliza-
tion, when successful, usually coincides with political consolidation. This point is
reinforced when considering recent (successful and unsuccessful) experiences with
inﬂation stabilization. Reviewing a sample of middle-income countries that have
gone through (low to high) inﬂation and attempts at stabilization, Haggard and
9Kaufman (1992) ﬁnd that price stability has been aﬀected by the political security
of government elites and their independence from short term pressures. Countries
characterized by party fragmentation have tended to be driven by “bidding wars”
among political elites competing for support. This bidding wars, expressed, for
instance, through the budget allocation, have reinforced cleavages among social
groups and undermined the eﬀorts to achieve price discipline by making it harder
to adopt measures of ﬁscal austerity. Conversely, inﬂation has tended to be low in
countries with authoritarian or catch all parties muting conﬂicts between social
forces. Relatively well organized political groups temporarily mobilize in settings
of party fragmentation or polarization and government with strong redistributive
orientation.
A case in point is Peru. In the seventies and eighties, Peru went through severe
budgetary problems after the withdrawal of external ﬁnancing. Domestic politics
clearly played a role in the response to this changing international environment.
Political mobilization and redistributive conﬂicts grew in the seventies, as did
inﬂation. Later on, labor and business protests against austerity derailed stabi-
lization program under Belaunde (1980-1985). The Apra government in 1985-1990
was severely fractionalized and the tactics of President Alan Garcia further polar-
ized the political system, making it impossible to achieve a consensus needed for a
painful stabilization (Haggard and Kaufman 1992, Gonzales 1991). Stabilization
did not come about until radical changes occurred in the political scene.
The evidence presented by Haggard and Kaufman from a sample of stabiliza-
tion episodes shows that high inﬂation episodes have been hard to control un-
der fragmented party systems, until they have been substituted by authoritarian
regimes or until civil liberties were greatly reduced. The relative capacity of dif-
ferent regimes to stabilize seems to be a function of political dynamics underlying
10inﬂationary pressure in the ﬁrst place.
Section 2.2 describes the model; the political-economic game has been high-
lighted. Macroeconomic details have been eschewed although they can be reintro-
duced following the lines of Drazen and Grilli (1990), Alesina and Drazen (1991),
or Guidotti and Vegh (1992) without essentially altering the game. Section 2.3
describes the equilibria. Section 2.4 oﬀers an example. Section 2.5 proposes an
equilibrium selection criterion. Section 2.6 discusses the role of asymmetries and
section 2.7 discusses the results and some modeling alternatives. Proofs of the
Propositions have been relegated to section 2.8.
2.2 The model
Consider an economy composed of two diﬀerent groups organized as political par-
ties (i,j = 1,2). At t = 0 a shock hits the economy reducing tax revenues.
From t = 0 until the date of stabilization, government expenditure (τ) has to
be covered by distortionary taxation (for instance, inﬂation tax). (I am ignoring
here the issues associated with the possibility of accumulating foreign debt. As
it becomes clear in Alesina and Drazen (1991), the explicit consideration of debt
accumulation does not aﬀect the results other than establishing a deadline for sta-
bilization.) Before the stabilization, each group pays half the taxes. In addition,
due to the distortions associated with pre-stabilization government ﬁnance, each
group suﬀers a welfare loss ci.
For stabilization to occur, one of the two groups (which becomes the loser) has
to agree to bear a fraction α > 1/2 of the new, nondistortionary taxation required
to replace distortionary taxes. The other group (the winner) will bear a fraction
1 − α of the new taxes. Additionally, stabilization will have some additional
stabilization costs to each group. Due to uncertainty about the poststabilization
11period, these costs are not known with certainty, but each political group has an
estimate value for these costs given by θi. The actual value of θi is known only
to group i, but it is common knowledge that θi is drawn from the distribution
function Fi(θi). That is to say, each group knows only probabilistically how much
the other group fears the pains associated with the stabilization period.2
Flow utility is linear in after-tax income. Before stabilization, ﬂow utility
for group i is equal to: UD
i = yi − ci − 1/2τ, where yi is the gross level of
income, assumed to be constant. After stabilization, ﬂow utility for the loser or
conceding party becomes: UL
i = yi−ατ −θi. Flow utility for the winner becomes:
UW
i = yi − (1 − α)τ − θi.3
Groups are inﬁnitely lived and discount the future according to r. The problem
of each party is to maximize its expected lifetime utility by choosing a time to
concede if the other party has not yet conceded. Obviously, concession times
will be aﬀected by the fear of stabilization costs. Formally, group i strategy is a
function Ti from the support of Fi(θi) to [0,∞], specifying for each possible value
of θi the time at which group i concedes if the other group has not yet given up.
If it plans to concede at time t, and its opponent behaves according to Tj(), group
i’s expected lifetime utility is:
Vi(t,Tj();θi) = Pr{Tj(θj) ≥ t} ×
hR x=t
x=0 UD


















The ﬁrst term in brackets is group i’s utility if group j remains ﬁghting at
time t; the second term in brackets is group i’s utility if group j concedes at some
time Tj(θj) before t. It is convenient to state the following assumptions:
2Since it is going to be assumed that the parties are risk neutral, the only relevant piece of
private information is the expected cost of stabilization for each group, and the function Fi(θi)
refers to the commonly known prior distribution of expected costs of stabilization.
3For simplicity, it is assumed that the costs of stabilization are suﬀered during all the post-
stabilization period. Nothing important will change if they are assumed (more realistically) to
be just temporary.
12(A1) F1(θ1) and F2(θ2) have the same support [θ, ¯ θ].
(A2) F1(θ1) and F2(θ2) are continuously diﬀerentiable and strictly increasing over
the interval [θ, ¯ θ].
(A3) ci + 1
2τ > ¯ θ + ατ.
(A1) and (A2) are adopted for simplicity. (A3) simply means that Pr{UL
i >
UD
i } = 1; that is, with probability one, even the conceding party expects to
be better oﬀ after the stabilization (Incomplete information is “small” in the
sense that it common knowledge that both groups are interested in stabilizing
the economy.) However, since θ is, after all, just an estimate of what is going to
happen in the future, this formulation does not exclude the possibility that a given
group ends up being a net loser after the stabilization, due to an underestimation
of the true costs of the adjustment.
2.3 Equilibrium
In the context of the model, a (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium will be a couple of
strategies {T1(θ1),T2(θ2)} such that, if group 1 behaves according to T1(θ1), group
2 ﬁnds it optimal to behave according to T2(θ2) and viceversa. Unlike Alesina and
Drazen (1991), I allow F1(θ1) to diﬀer from F2(θ2). This implies that, in general,
T1(θ1) is diﬀerent from T2(θ2) . We have:
Proposition 2.1 For {T1(θ1),T2(θ2)} a Bayesian equilibrium,
i) Ti(θi) = 0 for all θi ∈ [θ,mi] for some mi ≥ θ,
ii) T 0
i(θi) > 0 for all θi ∈ [mi, ¯ θ], and
iii) limθi↑¯ θ Ti(θi) = ∞.
Proposition 2.1 establishes that, in equilibrium, a group that expects to lose
very little after stabilization will tend to concede immediately. If the costs of
13adjustment is feared by a group (large θi), this group will wait longer to concede.
In the terminology of Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), there is “perpetual selection.”
It is convenient to deﬁne the inverse functions {Φ1(t),Φ2(t) : Φi(t) = T
−1
i (t)}
which represent the type of each group which in equilibrium concedes at time t.
(Types of each group are indexed by θi, that is, the expected cost of stabilization.)















(i,j = 1,2 and i 6= j) such that:
min{Φ1(0),Φ2(0)} = θ, (2.3)
then {Φ1(t),Φ2(t)} is a Bayesian equilibrium.
Proposition 2.2 generalizes Proposition 1 in Alesina and Drazen (1991). Equa-
tion (2.2) is a standard result in the war-of-attrition literature (see, for instance,
Fudenberg and Tirole (1986)). The RHS of equation (2.2) is the cost for group i of
waiting another instant to concede (UL
i −UD
i ). The LHS is the expected gain for
i from waiting another instant to concede, which is the product of the conditional
probability that group j concedes at time t (the term in brackets), multiplied by





Equation (2.3) has an antecedent in Nalebuﬀ and Riley (1985). In terms of
Proposition 1, equation (2.3) can be rewritten as: min{m1,m2} = θ. That is, at
least for one of the two groups mi has to be equal to θ. It must be clear that
this allows for many diﬀerent solutions to equation (2.2). For instance, if m1 is
set to be equal to θ, m2 becomes a free parameter. We could set m2 very close
to ¯ θ, and then group 2 concedes at time zero with very high probability (From
Proposition 2.1, Pr{T2(θ2) = 0} = Pr{θ2 ∈ [θ,mi]}. Or we could set m2 = θ,
14and then stabilization would be delayed with probability one. (This is the case
analyzed by Alesina and Drazen 1991.)
Such multiplicity of equilibria is an undesirable result because it strips the
theory from almost any predictive power. In section 2.5 this problem is discussed.
But before, a numerical example is oﬀered with the purposes of illustrating the
equilibrium of the model.
2.4 An example
A very ﬂexible functional form satisfying assumptions (A1) and (A2) is given by
Fi(θi) = 1 − (1 − θi)λi with support [0,1] and λi ∈ <+. For λi = 1, a uniform
distribution obtains. For λi < 1, a growing density obtains, and the opposite
happens for λi > 1.





















Equations (2.4)-(2.5) give us a system of nonlinear diﬀerential equations. If
we substitute v for 1 − Φ1(t) and w for 1 − Φ2(t), the system looks like:
v0 = Av + Bvw,
w0 = Cw + Dvw.
Comparative static results for Φ1(t) and Φ2(t) do not seem feasible without nu-
merical simulations, but the system has a solution for Φ1(t) and Φ2(t) given values
for Φ1(0) and Φ2(0) satisfying min{Φ1(0),Φ2(0)} = 0. The perfectly symmetric
case, with λ1 = λ2 and c1 = c2, on the contrary, can be solved analytically.
152.5 Equilibrium selection
As mentioned earlier, the multiplicity of equilibria is undesirable in this context.
However, small perturbations in the beliefs of both parties can be enough to pin
down one equilibrium. If both parties expect the other to be “irrationally unwilling
to ﬁght” with some arbitrarily small positive probability, no “rational” group will
concede at time zero and delay will occur wit probability one.
Another sensible way of selecting an equilibrium, inspired by Nalebuﬀ and
Riley (1985), assumes exactly the opposite. Suppose that each party believes that,
with an arbitrarily small probability, its opponent is “irrational” and is committed
to never give up. After some time, a rational group will become convinced that its
opponent is irrational and it will decide to concede even if its cost is the highest
possible (¯ θ). Using the last time of concession we can go backwards and establish
{m1,m2}.
Proposition 2.3 Suppose that, with probabilities p1 and p2 (where  is arbi-
trarily small) group 1 and group 2, respectively, are irrational and will never give
up. Then, the concession time for a rational group with cost ¯ θ will be ﬁnite and
the same for both parties. Moreover, the equilibrium will be unique.
Since  is arbitrarily small, we can let it go to zero and obtain an additional
condition “at inﬁnity” to select one equilibrium in the “unperturbed” model. It
must be clear that the perturbation is needed only because ci + 1
2τ > ¯ θ + ατ.
(With “large uncertainty,” that is, if ci + 1
2τ < ¯ θ +ατ, a rational group that fears
that the costs of stabilization will go above ci + (1
2 − α)τ would never consider









16Proposition 2.4 For  close to zero, c1 = c2 and p1 = p2, if M is positive
(negative), then m2 > θ (m1 > θ), that is, group 2 (group 1) concedes at time
zero with positive probability. If M = 0, m1 = m2 = θ, and stabilization will be
delayed with probability one.
An interesting property of the equilibrium, as it is clear from Proposition 2.3,
is that, in general, one party will concede at time zero with positive probability.
This suggests that even in a polarized society, the delay of stabilization will not
necessarily be the likely outcome of distributive struggle. Let assume from now
on, without loss of generality, that party 2 is the one conceding at time zero (the
“pessimistic” party).
2.6 Asymmetries in the conﬂict
|M| is a measure of the asymmetry introduced in the conﬂict by the diﬀerences
in the expected costs of stabilization for the two parties. If |M| is close to zero,
the costs of stabilization are “very close” in stochastic terms for the two interest
groups. In that case, it becomes more likely that stabilization will be delayed.
The opposite is the case if |M| is far from zero.
This result is similar to Hillman and Riley’s (1989) ﬁnding that asymmetric
valuations reduce the dissipation of politically contestable rents and transfers. In
a similar vein, Hirshleifer (1989) shows that, depending on the technology linking
the eﬀort of the conﬂicting parties to the distribution of a prize, asymmetries in
the valuation of the prize can give place to “one-sided submission.” One-sided sub-
mission corresponds to a group investing no eﬀort in the contest. The diﬀerences
between the analysis in this paper and the mentioned results is that here sym-
metry of valuations is deﬁned in stochastic terms, and that the “investment” in
the contest consists simply of waiting the other party out of the political conﬂict.
17A more general framework would certainly need to include as a choice variable
a measure of the eﬀort invested by each party during the political conﬂict over
stabilization proposals.
How about asymmetries in the cost of inﬂation for the groups involved in the
conﬂict?
Consider the system given by equations 2.2 and assume that there is perfect
symmetry, so that the equilibrium strategy Φ(t) is the same for both groups.
Then, a small increase in c1 will have as a result that group 1 tends to concede
earlier than group 2. (A more formal statement requires some additional work.)
2.7 Discussion and concluding remarks
Summarizing the results, we have that the equilibrium has the form of a system
of diﬀerential equations (2.2) plus a boundary condition. (If the two parties are
in a perfectly symmetric footing, the system reduces to one equation.) To obtain
clear results about the eﬀect of diﬀerent variables seem to require of numerical
simulations, as illustrated by a simple example.
Adopting the equilibrium selection criterion proposed in the previous section,
there is in general a positive probability that a political agreement will be achieved
immediately, because the party less concerned about what will happen after the
reform will concede at time zero with nonnegligible probability.
Stabilization will be more likely to be delayed the more similar are the beliefs
that the parties involved have the costs that stabilization will impose on each
other.
It is important to point out at least two lines of research that can be relevant
both in term of building better models as in terms of motivating empirical research.
While it is diﬃcult to generalize, even for countries within the same region,
18in some Latin American episodes the political conﬂict about stabilization has
followed more or less the same pattern: Organized labor and segments of the
population have opposed stabilization proposals by diﬀerent governments, and
their resistance has ﬁnally subsided when a government with populist antecedents
commits to stabilize the economy. May be a better story to ﬁt these episodes
should emphasize uncertainty in groups opposing the stabilization about the gov-
ernment motives and capabilities. Could the imperfect information bargaining
models developed to understand strikes and other labor conﬂicts at the micro
level serve to understand (some) macropolitical conﬂicts surrounding processes of
policy reform?
This paper, as virtually all of the literature on the subject I have referred to,
concentrates on the conﬂict side of the issue. Each party is assumed to know
how badly it is hurt by pre-stabilization distortions and how it is going to fare
in the aftermath of stabilization. In a sense, they only need to learn about each
other. In conﬂicts at the macro level, however, things are far from being that
clear. To make matters worse, policy positions are a public good for members
of political groups, and they can rationally prefer to remain ignorant about the
eﬀects of macroeconomic policy choices, unless they perceive that too much is at
stake. These line of argument is consistent with the common observation that
“things get really bad” before attempts at reform get signiﬁcant popular support.
One can hope that further political-economic modeling will help us to achieve a
better understanding of the forces that drive policy making during critical episodes
of stabilization and, in the end, will also be useful for policy design. (For an
argument about this “normative” role of political economy, see Rodrik 1993.)
In any event, one can fear that fragmented party systems that block national
consensus for reform will exhibit poor prospects for prompt stabilization under
19democracy.
2.8 Proofs
A rigorous demonstration for most of the content of Propositions 2.1 and 2.2 can
be found, in a more general setting, in Fudenberg and Tirole (1986); here the
proof is only sketched. The proof of Proposition 2.3 follows Nalebuﬀ and Riley
(1985) rather closely.
Proof of Propositions 2.1 and 2.2:
Ti is nondecreasing because decreasing θi does not change the payoﬀ to keep
ﬁghting but increases the payoﬀ to conceding. Ti must also be gapless: If there is
a gap [β0,β] in Ti (that is, an interval over which group i does not ﬁnd optimal to
concede for any possible θi), then there must be a gap (β0,β) in Tj because for any
θj it would be preferable to concede at time β0 than at (β0,β). But then the type
of group i planning to concede at β would be better oﬀ conceding at time β/2.
Furthermore, Ti must be atomless (except possibly at time zero): If there is some
nonnegligible probability of group i conceding at time η > 0 (a mass of types θi
conceding at time η), then there will be some interval (η − ,η) such that in that
interval group j will prefer to wait for the discontinuous jump in the probability
of group i conceding. But this would create a gap.
From the previous discussion follows that Ti must be continuous, decreasing
and diﬀerentiable over the subset of [θ,¯ θ] which give up in ﬁnite time. This
(partially) proves Proposition 2.1.
From the given properties of Ti if follows that its inverse Φi must be continuous,
strictly increasing and diﬀerentiable. (See Lemma 1(iv) in Fudenberg and Tirole
1986.) Equation (2.2) then follows from diﬀerentiating Vi(t,Tj();θi) with respect
to t and making the derivative equal to zero at Ti(θi) = t (or Φi(t) = θi). Where
20this derivative positive, group i would prefer to wait longer to concede, while were
it negative, group i would prefer to concede before Ti(θi).
Equation (2.3) can be proved by contradiction. If both groups were conceding
at time 0 with positive probability, any group would be better oﬀ by waiting
inﬁnitesimally to see if its rival concedes immediately.
Finally, notice that the maximum concession time ¯ T must be the same for
both parties: If group i is not expected to concede after time ¯ T, group j is
not going to wait until t > ¯ T to concede. Either (I) ¯ T < ∞ or (II) ¯ T = ∞.
Assume (II) and imagine that there is an interval [˜ θj, ¯ θ] such that if θj ≥ ˜ θj then
Tj(θj) = ∞. Now, Fj(˜ θj) < 1 for ˜ θj < ¯ θ, and, as Φj is monotone and strictly
increasing, limt→∞ Φ0
j(t) = 0. Thus there exists t such that the LHS of equation
(2.2) becomes zero, and group i should stop conceding earlier. Unless ˜ θj = ¯ θ, as in
Proposition 2.1, we get a contradiction. Similarly, assume (I). Then Tj(θ) = ¯ T is
ﬁnite. But since 1−Fj(¯ θ) = 0 and Φ0
j(¯ T) > 0, the LHS of equation (2.2) becomes
inﬁnite at time ¯ T , and group i should wait to concede later.
Proof of Proposition 2.3:
Under the assumption of the Proposition, the probability that group i concedes
before time t becomes: Gi(Φi(t)) = (1 − pi)Fi(Φi(t)). Using Gi instead of Fi we


































ci − ¯ θ + (1
2 − α)τ
dx = ln(pi) ×
(2α − 1)τr−1
ci − ¯ θ + (1
2 − α)τ
.
That is, Ti(¯ θ) < ∞. Now, Tj(θ) = Ti(θ), because if group i will not concede after
























This implicitly deﬁnes a ﬁrst order diﬀerential equation for θ2 as a function of θ1.















Then, integrating in (2.7), we obtain a mapping from the type of group 1 that
concedes at a given time to the type of group 2 that concedes at the same time:
H2(θ2) = H1(θ1) + k. (2.9)
where k is an integration constant. Since the last concession time is the same for
both groups, k is given by:
k = H2(¯ θ) − H1(¯ θ). (2.10)
Proof of Proposition 2.4:
Let deﬁne M() as:
M() ≡ H1(¯ θ) − H1(θ) − H2(¯ θ) + H2(θ). (2.11)
From (2.8), integrating by parts:
Hi(θi) =













In (2.11), assuming c1 = c2 = c,
M() =




















22When  goes to zero, G can be replaced by F in M() (except at the limit x = ¯ θ).










(The integrand is bounded at the endpoint x = ¯ θ under the assumption that
F 0
i(¯ θ) / ∈ {0,∞}.) Now, if m2 > θ, then Φ1(0) = θ. Using equations (2.9) and
(2.10):
H2(m2) = H1(¯ θ) + H2(θ) − H1(θ)
or:
H1(¯ θ) − H1(θ) − H2(m2) + H2(θ) = 0.
Using the deﬁnition of M() (equation (2.11)):
M() + H2(¯ θ) − H2(m2) = 0.
Since H2 is decreasing:
M() > 0.
23Chapter 3
Sequencing of Economic Reforms
under Political Constraints
3.1 Introduction
In recent years, a number of countries in Eastern Europe and Latin America have
embraced a wide range of market-oriented reforms, sometimes during macroeco-
nomic crisis of unprecedented proportions. Some examples are the Bolivian pack-
age of 1985, and the Polish Balcerowicz plan, the Menem reforms in Argentina,
the Plano Collor in Brazil, and the Fujimori reforms in Peru, all in 1990. (Com-
prehensive attempts at reform have also being pursued in Mexico and Venezuela,
and, following Poland, throughout Eastern Europe.)
The radicalism of these programs stands in striking contrast with the recom-
mendations of the economic literature on the timing and sequencing of reforms.
While there is no consensus on the optimal ordering of reforms, many (maybe
most) authors agree that a carefully phased gradualist approach minimizes the
costs of transition. For instance, it is typically stated that measures oriented to
restore state solvency and insure macroeconomic stabilization should precede full
liberalization.
The strategy followed in the cases mentioned has been, instead, to introduce
24reforms as swiftly as possible. Such “bitter pill” reform strategies have indeed been
painful, seemingly giving the reason to those advocating a more paused stance.
The question posed by these experiences is, in Rodrik’s (1992) words: “If a period
of macro instability is the worst time to undertake a trade reform, why are so
many countries doing it?” More generally, why do countries attempt to initiate
all sort of reforms simultaneously?
This chapter proposes an answer to that question: Political constraints moti-
vate governments to go for comprehensiveness and speed in implementing reforms,
even when this strategy entails some additional costs.
Section 3.2 reviews the arguments in favor of gradualism given in the eco-
nomic literature. Most of the literature assumes that the objective of a reforming
government is to maximize social welfare. This suggests a ﬁrst best strategy of
removing all existing distortions simultaneously. Hence, formal arguments in fa-
vor of gradualism follow the logic of second-best: Given a distortion that cannot
be removed, reform cannot simply consist in getting ride of all other distortions
simultaneously. More recently, some authors have given an additional formal ar-
gument in favor of gradualism in the existence of externalities arising during the
adjustment process itself. In the presence of those externalities, the private sector
cannot be trusted to choose the socially optimal pace of adjustment to the new
conditions if all preexisting distortions are removed at once.
Section 3.3 presents the politico-economic objections against gradualism. Some
of these objections relate to credibility problems, while some others to political
sustainability diﬃculties of step-by-step strategies. Some simple examples are
provided to illustrate how these considerations can remove the advantage of a
gradualist approach even when economic reasoning alone calls for it.
The argument rests on the distributive consequences of reform. By widening
25the scope of eﬃciency improving reforms, the government is more likely to gain
the support of larger segments of the population, particularly if the losers of each
particular measure are beneﬁced by other measures. If the government needs to
pass a threshold of popular support at each step, a gradual process risks being
stopped at each stage by the group being hurt at that point. Hence, the govern-
ment may need to implement all reforms simultaneously even if this entails some
aggregate costs. Credibility and political sustainability are clearly intertwined.
The argument itself is hardly new (practitioners seem to be keenly aware of
it); the purpose of this chapter is to show its validity in the context of familiar
economic models. This is pertinent since some authors (notably Rodrik 1989) have
advocated reforms that are “large in magnitude but narrow in scope.” Section
3.4 presents some evidence (of admittedly anecdotal character) that suggests that
wide-scope reforms have indeed been implemented, in spite of severe economic
diﬃculties. Section 3.5 contains some concluding remarks.
3.2 The literature on gradualism
The early literature on timing and sequencing of economic reforms was spurred by
the experience of the Southern Cone of Latin America in the late 1970s and early
1980s. The attempted liberalizations under military rule in Chile, Argentina, and
Uruguay led to a series of bank panics and ﬁnancial collapses. Several authors
attribute these diﬃculties to mistakes in the order of liberalization (Diaz Alejan-
dro 1985, Corbo and de Melo 1985, and Edwards and Edwards 1987). It was
commonly emphasized the need to balance the central government ﬁnances before
undertaking other reforms. The debate centered on the order of liberalization of
the trade and capital accounts, with the majority of authors favoring the opening
of the former before the liberalization of the latter in order to avoid undesirable
26capital ﬂows. (See, e.g., McKinnon 1991. For a dissenting view, see Lal 1987.)
Most of the early literature was informal; the emphasis was in giving policy
advice to avoid the diﬃculties that plagued eﬀorts at economic reform in Latin
America. Subsequent research has been more precise in making statements about
welfare gains or losses associated with diﬀerent sequences (Edwards 1992).
Clearly, under competitive equilibrium assumptions, welfare maximization is
obtained by removing all distortions simultaneously. As long as the perceived
private costs and beneﬁts correspond to the true social costs and beneﬁts, private
economic agents will chose the socially correct pace of adjustment following a full
scale liberalization. It is important to make the distinction between economic
reform and economic restructuring. In economies that have been highly distorted,
economic restructuring is certain to take a long time, even if economic reform
(a collection of policy decisions) occurs all of a sudden. “Radical reform” is the
ﬁrst best reform strategy, as was argued by Mussa (1982) early on in the debate
about gradualism. Hence, arguments for gradualism must rely on the presence
of distortions during the adjustment process or on distributive concerns. In this
section we will focus on the former; distributive considerations will be discussed
in the next section.
One possible argument for gradualism is the presence of preexisting distortions
in one or several markets that can not be removed at the time the reform plan is
announced. Potential candidates are labor market interventions, domestic capital
market imperfections , and limits to foreign debt that are not perceived as binding
by individual private agents (See, for instance, Edwards and Van Wijnberger 1986
and Edwards 1992). In all these cases, one can imagine circumstances in which the
second best reform strategy will involve some degree of gradualism, for instance,
in the speed of trade liberalization.
27A related argument, put forward by Calvo (1989), emphasizes the equivalence
of imperfect credibility to an intertemporal distortion. In one of Calvo’s examples,
if the public wrongly believes that a trade liberalization will be reverted in the
future, quantitative control of the capital account may be called for. The problem
with this type of argument is that, in its simplest form, it assumes that credibil-
ity problems arise because the government “knows better” than the public what
is going to happen in the future. A closer look at the source of the credibility
problem is necessary to assess the right policy response. For instance, if imperfect
credibility arises because the public is unsure about the “true preferences” of the
government, overshooting can act as a signaling device (Rodrik 1989a). Or, as
argued in the next section, if credibility problems are related to political sustain-
ability of the reforms, a big bang can be the only way of cutting through the
Gordian knot of implicit rents generated by government interventions.
Another argument in favor of gradualism is the nonexistence or precariousness
of a “safety net” to smooth the eﬀects of massive redundancies of labor during the
process of economic transformation.This safety net is to be understood as a public
good needed to reduce costs such as losses of human capital. Both Latin American
and Eastern European countries have had fragmentary and rudimentary systems
for income maintenance and welfare delivery (Przeworski 1991).
A similar “capacity constraint” is given by the limited availability of loyal and
qualiﬁed technocrats to carry on the process of reforms. It is true that capacity
constraints of the economic team can be important in some cases, as in the process
of privatization, where some “learning by doing” is likely to occur. According to
Krueger (1992), the most sensible procedure, given the limitations of the economic
team, is to emphasize the swift removal of distortions that inhibit the creation of
new sources of income instead of focusing in the disposal of old public assets.
28More recently, Gavin (1993) has focused on ineﬃciencies inherent in the ad-
justment process itself. The private sector response to reform may be suboptimal
(too fast) if there is a congestion externality in the form of a limited capacity of
absorption of the labor market.1
In sum, economic arguments in favor of gradualism are of a second-best na-
ture. In the next section it will be argued that, even in cases where some of
the arguments above apply, a big-bang may still be the best feasible policy given
political constraints.
3.3 The political economy case for radical re-
form
Though far from conclusive, the evidence presented in the next section seems
to suggest that radical reforms are costly, particularly when the urgency to “get
things done” leads to the adoption of bad designs. Comprehensive reform pack-
ages, however, not only have been adopted by a number of countries but they
have also enjoyed considerable initial support. For an explanation, we turn now
to political-economic arguments.
Rodrik (1989a) has argued that overshooting a reform may be useful for a
government that wants to signal its seriousness to a jaded public that has lived
through too many failed reforms. This reasoning compelling, although, when
they are not due to plain policy inconsistencies, credibility problems are linked to
political sustainability of economic policies.2 Countries adopting radical reforms
1Aghion and Blanchard (1993) have also built a model of large- scale economic reforms with
limited private job creation. They conclude that there is a maximum speed at which the state
sector can be closed. However, voluntary closing and restructuring of state ﬁrms by their own
workers might fall below the optimum speed.
2In a paper that takes precisely this point of view, Van Wijnbergen (1992) argues against
gradualism in the removal of price controls, on the grounds that resulting hoarding can lead
the median voter to subestimate the eﬃciency beneﬁts from the reform. (Van Wijnbergen’s
argument relies, however, in the public disregarding the occurrence of hoarding.)
29have been characterized, for the most, by weak states, vulnerable to pressures
from large ﬁrms and organized interests. In this circumstances, policy actions
with distributive consequence can be eﬀectively blocked by the groups being hurt
(if they have time to organize). Lal (1987) and Krueger (1992) have emphasized
the need for speed in the transition: A longer transition enables pressure groups
to organize and oppose successfully the reforms.
To this reasoning in favor of speed in the process of reforms, it is possible to add
one in favor of comprehensiveness. By widening the scope of eﬃciency-improving
reforms initiated simultaneously, the government is more likely to gain the support
of larger segments of the population. For many agents, losses from one reform
can be more than compensated by gains from the others. For instance, putting an
end to a near hyperinﬂationary situation is going to beneﬁt (almost) everybody.
Hence, linking the fate of the reforms can be a way of weakening the opposition
to them.3 That is to say, if the government is not able to credibly commit to
a certain course of action, it may need to implement all reforms simultaneously,
even when economic reasoning calls for a second-best gradualist approach. Even if
high, the costs involved in a radical reform can be smaller than the costs involved
in a truncated reform.
In 3.3.2, a simple general equilibrium example to illustrate how political-
economic considerations can revert the second-best argument in favor of grad-
ualism in the presence of preexisting distortions that cannot be removed at the
time the reform plan is announced.. In 3.3.3 another example is sketched to show
how political-economic considerations could revert the argument in favor of grad-
ualism when there are congestion externalities in the process of adjustment. But
3A similar idea underlies the discussion about economic reform in Buchanan (1991). A
slightly diﬀerent version of the same argument is made by Rodrik (1992b). He shows that an
agenda-setter may be able to sneak-in a reform with distributive consequences alongside with
one with across-the-board beneﬁts by packaging the two together.
30before, in 3.3.1, a sequential move game structure is used to show the logic of the
argument in the most transparent way.
3.3.1 The argument
Consider a government trying to implement reforms F (e.g., a ﬁscal reform needed
to successfully stabilize prices) and T (e.g., a trade reform). Besides the govern-
ment, there are two interest groups: f and t. Reform F, if carried alone, will hurt
group f and will beneﬁt group t. Reform T, on the other hand, will hurt group
t and will beneﬁt group f. It is assumed that, on optimality grounds, reform T
should be carried over after F is secure. One example could be a trade reform
that needs macroeconomic stability to minimize transition costs.
If the gradualist approach is pursued, that is, if T is undertaken after F is
completed, both f and t end up being better oﬀ than in the initial situation.
However, group t would prefer the reform process to be truncated after reform F
is accomplished.
Alternatively, the government can start both reforms simultaneously. The
payoﬀs of following this radical approach are higher for f and t than those from the
initial situation, but lower than those obtained after a gradualist reform process.
The government is modeled as an agenda-setter who holds the initiative to
oﬀer reform plans at several points in time.4 For simplicity, the example assumes
a utilitarian government, that is, a government interested in maximizing the sum
of the utilities of the groups. The same results, however, can be obtained from
a number of diﬀerent speciﬁcations of the government’s objective. A predator
government that takes a percentage of the total pie is also consistent with the
payoﬀ speciﬁcation.
4See Romer and Rosenthal (1979) for a discussion of the agenda setter game, and Dewatripont
and Roland (1992) for another application to the problem of economic reform.
31Government Group f Group t
Status quo 0 0 0
Truncated reform 1 -1 3
Gradualist reform 2 2 2
Radical reform 1 1 1
Table 3.1: Payoﬀs to the diﬀerent agents.-
Pressure groups have no capacity to articulate counterproposals, but can eﬀec-
tively veto any reform plan. In deciding a sequence of proposals, the government
must take into account not only economic considerations (the payoﬀs associated
with the ﬁnal point) but also the possibility of pulling oﬀ the reforms. Neither
the government nor the diﬀerent interest groups have the capacity to precommit
their actions.
Figure 3.1 shows schematically the extended form of this game. For illustration
purposes, the payoﬀ structure presented in table 3.1 has been chosen.
These payoﬀs reﬂect the following assumptions: 1) There is a need for reform
(low payoﬀ of status quo); 2) If feasible, a gradual reform is preferable to a radical
reform due to its lower costs; and 3) A partial or truncated reform will favor one
group and will hurt the other.
The government has three choices at the initial node: Proposing a gradual
path (starting by reforming sector F), doing nothing, or proposing a big-bang
(reforming both sectors simultaneously). If the government makes a proposal,
each group will either accept it or reject it. The opposition of any group is enough
to paralyze the government’s proposal.
Imagine for a moment that the government proposes F and that this is ac-
cepted by both groups. When T is proposed in the next period, group t will veto,
since it prefers 3 over 2. Knowing that this path will lead to a payoﬀ of -1, group
32f will veto the original proposal. Hence gradual reform is not a subgame perfect
equilibrium. (A subgame perfect equilibrium requires rational choice by every
decision making at every node, even in those that are not reached in equilibrium.)
Moreover, it is not even a Nash equilibrium: It can be sustained only by the belief
by group f that group t will not act to truncate the reforms. The government,
understanding that a gradual reform is not feasible, will propose a radical reform,
which will be accepted by both groups, constituting the unique subgame perfect
equilibrium to this game. Hence, even though gradualism is preferred to the rad-
ical reform outcome by everybody, it is not going to be proposed. Notice that if
group t could commit to accepting the second stage proposal, everyone would be
better oﬀ. In this sense, the problem is analogous to well known time consistency
problems in games between the government and a uniﬁed general public.
For simplicity, the strategy of starting reform T before reform F has been ig-
nored. This strategy could also be credible for certain payoﬀ structures. That is,
political considerations could even lead to a reversal of the economically optimal
reform path. Introduction of political feasibility considerations may reverse “tech-
nocratic” economic prescriptions. Of course, if the government had the power (and
will) to change the rules of the game in order to make other outcomes feasible,
that would be the recommended course of action.
In 3.3.2, a simple example is used to show that payoﬀ structures as those
assumed in table 3.1 can be obtained from familiar general-equilibrium settings in
which the existence of temporary distortions would call, on pure welfare theoretical
grounds, for a second-best gradualist path. In 3.3.3 another example is sketched
in a setting in which congestion externalities would call for a gradualist path. The
examples are not chosen by its realism by rather by its simplicity.
333.3.2 A general equilibrium example
Consider a two-sector economy in which each sector produces a distinct good, X
(exports) or Y (importables), using one factor of production (L). The technology
for producing exports is given by: X = L1/2
x . We can think of the export industry
as consisting of a number n of ﬁrms using the production function: xi = (lxi/n)1/2.
Similarly, the technology for producing importables is given by: Y = L1/2
y , and
we can think of the importables industry as consisting of a ﬁxed number of ﬁrms.
Labor is supplied inelastically; the quantity of labor available in the economy
is normalized to one. There are three diﬀerent types of agents in this economy:
Workers, who supply labor, owners of the export ﬁrms, and owners of the importa-
bles ﬁrms. Their (aggregate) income is given, respectively, by the total payroll,
proﬁts of the export industry, and proﬁts of the importables industry. The ex-
change rate and the international prices of exports and importables are equal to
one; agents in this economy only consume importables. Finally, in the initial situ-
ation, there is a tariﬀ τ on imports and a subsidy s on exports. A fraction Lb of the
labor force is employed in a bureaucracy whose objective is to administer tariﬀs
and subsidies. (This captures the “cross-hauling” view that policy interventions
that cancel each other in a distributive sense, imply extra losses due to directly
unproductive activities, as in Magee et al. 1989.) The initial level of bureaucratic
employment is assumed to be above the level required for such administration.
Public deﬁcit (surplus) results in lump-sum taxes (transfers) to the workers.












34The equilibrium condition in the labor market is:
Lx + Ly + Lb = 1. (3.2)
From (3.1) and (3.2) we can get:
w =
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Since agents spend all their income in importable goods, real income of workers,
















The term T represents lump-sum taxes to cover the ﬁscal deﬁcit, and it is
given by:
T = (s − τ)X + wLb. (3.7)
Equation (3.7) closes the model. In (3.7) it is implicitly assumed that exports
equal imports. (Even though we will consider diﬀerent periods, we will neglect
35O Ia Ib IIa IIb IIc
s 0.2 0.2 0.2 0 0 0
τ 0.2 0.2 0 0.2 0 0
Lb 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0 0.1
Il 0.6325 0.6708 0.5952 0.7187 0.7071 0.6708
Ix 0.3162 0.3354 0.4373 0.2531 0.3536 0.3354
Iy 0.3162 0.3354 0.3037 0.3644 0.3536 0.3354
I 1.2649 1.3416 1.3362 1.3362 1.4143 1.3416
Table 3.2: Payoﬀs under diﬀerent policy scenarios.-
intertemporal links, so that the trade balance will be assumed to be in equilibrium
at all times.) It is straightforward (though tedious) to verify that:
Il + Ix + Iy = X + Y.
Let I ≡ Il + Ix + Iy. This represents the total consumption of importables
by the economy (and total production evaluated at international prices). Table
3.2 illustrates the real income or payoﬀs for the diﬀerent agent types that obtain
from diﬀerent combinations of s, τ, and Lb.
The purpose of this example is to show that there are circumstances in which
a radical reform strategy will be pursued in lieu of a gradualist strategy, even if,
due to some transitory distortion, it entails lower aggregate payoﬀs.
Suppose the initial situation (period 0) was given by the column O in table
3.2. Clearly, the ﬁrst-best strategy would be to eliminate all distortions (that is,
to set s = τ = Lb = 0), leading the economy during period 1 to the position given
by column IIb, where social welfare is maximized.
The following are the institutional rules:
(a) The government is the agenda-setter. During period 1, it can propose contem-
poraneous changes in τ and Lb and it can decide changes in s to be eﬀective
36in period 2. During period 2, it can propose contemporaneous changes in τ
and Lb. (Export subsidies are decided one period ahead, so that s = 0.2 dur-
ing period 1; this is the distortion that introduces the second-best optimality
of gradualism.)5
(b) At least Lb = 0.1 is necessary to administer any tariﬀ or subsidy.
(c) Each group of agents (workers, producers of importables, and exporters) has
the power to block any policy initiative. In case of blockage, the result-
ing outcome is the status quo. (The veto assumption could be replaced
with majority voting, and the same result would obtain under appropriate
assumptions.)6
(d) The objective of the government is to maximize aggregate income.
(e) There are no side payments.
Given that s = 0.2 is ﬁxed during period 1, the second-best reform strategy
consists clearly of: (a) During period 1, lower Lb to 0.1, keep τ = 0.2, and decide to
eliminate subsidies during the next period. (b) When period 2 arrives, eliminate
all remaining distortions. This strategy lead us from column O in period 0, to
column Ia in period 1, to column IIb in period 2. This strategy can be called
gradualism.
The problem with gradualism is the following. Suppose that everybody agrees
with the prescribed decisions in period 1. When period 2 arrives, producers of
5This particular distortion is assumed for simplcity. As noted before, the purpose of the
example is not to explore the advantages odf a gradualist stance in any speciﬁc case. Rather, it
is to point out the political-economic diﬃculties of carrying out such a strategy even when it is
desirable on some other grounds.
6Policy making at this frequency (specially in Latin America) seems to be better modeled
as the outcome of a (perhaps nested) pressure group game, than as the outcome of a “western
style” voting game.
37importable goods and workers will not ﬁnd convenient to support a move towards
free trade any longer: Vetoing any government proposal leads them to column
IIa (tariﬀs-cum-bureaucratic employment), where they are better oﬀ than under
column IIb (free trade). However, under column IIa exporters are worse oﬀ than
in the initial situation. Anticipating that, exporters will not ﬁnd it advantageous
to support the prescribed decisions in period 1 in the ﬁrst term. Gradualism is
not credible because it is politically unsustainable.
Now consider the strategy of removing policy interventions as soon as it is
possible. That is, in period 1 lower Lb to 0.1, reduce τ to zero (Ib), and decide to
eliminate subsidies during the next period. In period 2, it only rests to disband
the bureaucracy that served to pay subsidies during period 1. This strategy can
be called radical reform. Even though it entails lower payoﬀs than gradualism
during period 1 (in fact, it introduces a distortion by making tariﬀs to diﬀer from
export subsidies for a while), it is politically sustainable. Notice that vetoing the
reform during period 2 would lead the economy to column IIc, where everybody
is worse oﬀ than under IIb.
While radical reform is credible (i.e., constitutes a subgame perfect equilib-
rium), it is not the welfare maximizing credible strategy. The government could
keep in period 1 a positive tariﬀ (to reduce distortions associated with export sub-
sidies) low enough to make producers of importables to prefer it to be removed
together with bureaucratic employment in period 2. But in this way we get fur-
ther and further following a second-best logic. Even if the strict case for radical
reform fails, it may very well end up being the lesser evil among possible alterna-
tives when considering the amount of resources that can end up being consumed
in lobbying activity identifying sectors that should be subject of “temporary”
protection from the transition process.
383.3.3 An example with a congestion externality
Recently, Gavin (1993) has argued in favor of gradualism on the grounds that there
could exist a congestion externality in the form of a limited capacity of absorption
of the labor market. This externality can be accommodated into the general
equilibrium framework described in the previous subsection. The advantage of
this procedure is to consider explicitly unemployment as the cost of radical reform.
This is in agreement with the factual observation of increased unemployment
during radical reform processes and the common perception of this unemployment
as a cost of those processes (see, e.g., Przeworski 1993).
Consider a general equilibrium model with the production functions described
in the previous subsection and the same three types of agents. It is still assumed
that workers end up paying or receiving each period the current public deﬁcit or
surplus, but no restriction is imposed about the number of bureaucrats necessary
to administer tariﬀs or subsidies. The other institutional rules described in the
previous subsection ((a) and (c)- (e)) are still binding, so that the government is a
benevolent agenda-setter and each group of agents has veto power. A simple way
of introducing a congestion externality is by postulating that the export sector
(which is to grow under the reforms) has a maximum capacity of labor absorption
per period given by Kx which will be assumed to take a value of 0.12.
As in the previous example, we have three periods. In the initial situation
(period 0), there is a tariﬀ τ = 0.2 and bureaucratic employment Lb = 0.2 that
should be eliminated. Payoﬀs for each group of agents in period zero appear in ta-
ble 3.3 as column O. A gradualist strategy would consist of reducing bureaucratic
employment to zero (reform F) in period 1 and removing the tariﬀ (reform T )
in period 2. Payoﬀs corresponding to period 1 and period 2 under the gradualist
strategy are described by columns Ia and II in table 3.3. It is easy to check that
39O Ia Ib II
s 0 0 0 0
τ 0.2 0.2 0 0
Lb 0.2 0 0 0
U 0 0 0.0118 0
Il 0.6772 0.7576 0.7023 0.7071
Ix 0.2389 0.2667 0.3347 0.3536
Iy 0.3436 0.3481 0.3676 0.3536
I 1.2597 1.4084 1.4046 1.4143
Table 3.3: Payoﬀs under diﬀerent policy scenarios.-
the constraint in the absorption capacity of the exports sector is not binding so
that the model is solved as described by equations (3.1) - (3.7) in the previous
subsection and no unemployment arises (U = 0). The problem with gradualism
is that, as seen in table 3,.3, it is not politically feasible: Once reform F is under-
taken, workers and owners of importables ﬁrms will veto a further move to free
trade (remember the assumption that workers perceive any ﬁscal surplus). Notice,
anyway, that a truncated gradualist strategy (staying in column Ia forever) is still
Pareto improving.
Alternatively, the government can decide to follow a radical strategy, adopting
reforms F and T simultaneously in period 1. As a result, too many workers will
look for jobs in the exporters sector in relation to the capacity of absorption of
this sector. Hence, the economy cannot jump instantaneously to the situation
described by column II. The transition period is described by column Ib. Workers
leaving the bureaucratic sector as a consequence of the closing of state ﬁrms
will look for jobs in the exports sector until the point were the wage in that
sector multiplied by the probability of ﬁnding a job is equal to the wage in the
importables sector (The probability of ﬁnding a job will be equal to the constrain




Assuming that wages are still given by marginal productivity, and using the
fact that the employment in X in period 1 is given by the previous period’s em-
ployment plus K, the previous equation gives as a quadratic expression in Sx with
a solution in Sx = 0.1318. Hence, some workers looking for jobs in sector X will
remain unemployed during the transition period. Moreover, during the transition
period aggregate income is lower with radical reform than with gradualism.
However, a government interested in maximizing aggregate income will pro-
mote a radical reform because it entails a larger income than a truncated gradual
reform (assuming no discounting) and because it is politically feasible.
Diﬀerent values of the initial distortions (τ and Lb) and diﬀerent institutional
rules (which group of workers is represented in the veto game at each stage) are
likely to make diﬀerent outcomes politically feasible.
3.4 Some evidence
Poland. Perhaps the best example of radical reform is the one undertaken by
Poland under Deputy Prime Minister Leszek Balcerowicz. Poland’s strategy was
to introduce economic liberalization, macroeconomic stabilization, and privatiza-
tion as rapidly as possible. Substantial steps toward the ﬁrst two objectives were
given in a single package or “big bang” on January 1, 1990. Crucial decisions with
respect to free trade, market pricing, end of state orders and central planning, key
aspects of commercial law, large cuts in budget subsidies, higher tax collections,
wage controls, and a sharp devaluation of the currency occurred in the space of a
few weeks at the end of 1989 and beginning of 1990 (Sachs 1992). A privatization
law was put in place in June 1990. Since then, privatization has gone slowly in
41the case of the largest ﬁrms, but small and medium- sized businesses has been
privatized with great success. Sachs (1992) characterizes the ﬁrst two years as
an end to inﬂation and shortages, a slight decline in average consumption, an
increase in the quality and variety of goods available, and a sharp increase in the
unemployment rate (Although he attributes the rise in unemployment at least
partially to the breakdown of trade relations with the former Soviet Union). Not
surprisingly, given his role as advisor to the Polish government during 1990-1991,
Sachs considers that the consistency and boldness of the reforms may have eased
the “valley of tears” unavoidable after a profound economic transformation. What
is surprising is that an overwhelming proportion of the population supported the
government in spite of the painful ﬁrst months. Przeworski (1991, p.165) oﬀers
some evidence in this regard. It seems clear that a more paused stance would
have hardly mustered as much political support as the radical program did, at
least during the launching of the program.
Bolivia. Another clear example of radical reform was the Bolivian package
of August 1985. The stabilization program, destined to stop a skyrocketing hy-
perinﬂation, relied on exchange-rate uniﬁcation, supported domestically by tight
monetary and ﬁscal policies and externally by a signiﬁcant debt alleviation. The
program included an abrupt liberalization of credit and goods markets and dereg-
ulation of the labor market. Most price controls and other interventions were
dismantled and signiﬁcant layoﬀs occurred in the public sector, particularly in
the state mining enterprises (Morales 1991). The reforms were undertaken during
the Paz-Estenssoro government. While the labor movement had been eﬀective in
vetoing previous reform plans, it was unsuccessful in organizing opposition to the
Paz-Estenssoro reforms. The government obtained the support of the two main
political parties, which facilitated the approval of the program by the Congress.
42Peru. On August 8, 1990, ten days after its inauguration, the newly elected
President Fujimori departed from his campaign promises by producing a shock-
treatment stabilization package, while announcing his intention to launch major
economic reforms. Main components of the paquetazo were huge increases in prices
of publicly provided goods and services and other measures destined to put an end
to the ﬁscal origin of hyperinﬂationary monetary emission. During the following
months, and particularly during March of 1991, rapid and extensive liberalization
of foreign trade and the capital account, and reduction of public sector employ-
ment were undertaken. Paredes (1991) argues that the simultaneous introduction
of these reforms probably increased the short-term costs of the program in relation
to a well-designed (i.e. piece-meal) stabilization program. He is particularly critic
of the opening of the foreign trade before tax reform, needed to insure ﬁscal stabil-
ity, was completed. An example of the diﬃculties associated with the adoption of
far-reaching reforms before stabilization is secure were the diﬃculties of exporters
and producers of importable goods in the face of an overvalued currency.
Fujimori’s popularity declined temporarily after he embraced a bitter- pill
strategy. However, the orientation of his economic program has remained widely
accepted. (See Przeworski 1991, p. 165 for survey data on the popular conﬁdence
on the minister of the economy after the shock.)
Argentina. Contrary to the case under Alfonsin, Argentina under Menem is an
example of orthodox and synoptic path of economic liberalization (Armijo 1992).
Stabilization was undertaken in March 1991 with the Convertibility Plan. An
ambitious ﬁscal reform, including a signiﬁcant reduction of public employment,
allowed the government to double its real revenues from 1989 to 1991. On the
trade front, the average tariﬀ has been reduced from 28% in 1985-87 to 15% in
1991-92. In the same period, the maximum import tariﬀ has fallen from 55% to
4322%, and the coverage of non-tariﬀ barriers has gone from 32% to 8%. Dereg-
ulation was also pervasive: In 1991, one single piece of legislation (the possibly
unconstitutional “Derogation Act”) cleaned out an entire range of limitations
to free-market activities, such as regulations of professional activities, of trans-
portation and telecommunications, of retail hours (stores in Argentina used to be
forbidden from operating during great part of the weekend), etc. But perhaps
the most impressive record of the government is on the privatization issue. From
1992 on, privatization has proceeded at breakneck speed. Without much regard
for price, the government has sold airlines, steel companies, part of the state oil
exploitations, oil reﬁneries, public services such as phone, water, and electricity
distribution in major cities, and even military production facilities. The list for
1993 includes major savings institutions.
Some of the costs of such a speedy process have been related to not taking
advantage of a possible process of “learning by privatizing.” Privatization of
public utilities was implemented even before developing an adequate regulatory
framework. Another major cost of simultaneous reforms is the current account
deﬁcit induced by an overvalued currency (ﬁxed nominal exchange rate and low
but positive inﬂation). In spite of these diﬃculties (plus a few corruption scandals)
the Menem administration seems to be doing quite well in terms of its popularity.
3.5 Conclusions
An understanding of the conditions under which political considerations induce
biases toward radical reform is essential in order to evaluate recent experiences in
Latin America and in terms of the design of new reform programs.
From a positive point of view, the question is why Latin American countries
that failed when implementing gradualist programs in the early 1980s have been
44relatively successful later in undertaking more comprehensive attempts at reform.
This is somewhat surprising given the increased economic and administrative costs
of such attempts in relation to more paused reform processes. A key element seems
to have been the building of political support through a wider scope of the reform
process. Thus, reform has been usually accompanied by political realignment.
Since no sector of society wants to be the ﬁrst in renouncing to its apportionment of
special privileges, reformist governments felt necessary to cut through the Gordian
knot of government-created rents. By providing an explanation for this behavior,
we will make progress in answering the more general question of why political
leaders in some countries have been able (and willing) to win popular support
for market-based policies whereas interventionist programs still prevail in other
countries. As noticed by Bates (1990), investigating a question like this will lead
us closer to the Smithian root of development studies: The political introduction
of markets.
From a normative point of view, the main point of this chapter is that even in
circumstances in which economic reasoning indicates that reforms should be made
sequentially, political considerations can make them “complementary.” In imple-
menting reform programs, policymakers should be aware of these considerations.
This result stands in contrast to Rodrik’s (1989) recommendation of undertaking
deep reforms with a narrow scope. On the other hand, we agree with Roger Dou-
glas (1990) reﬂections on the principles of politically successful structural reform,
inspired by his experience as New Zealand’s Finance Minister: “Large packages
provide the ﬂexibility to ensure that losses suﬀered by any one group are oﬀset
by gains by the same group in other areas [...] It is uncertainty, not speed, that
endangers structural reform programs.” With respect to the role of international
agencies in promoting the use of markets in developing countries, it is clear that
45these agencies should carefully assess political restrictions when assisting countries
undertaking liberalization processes. Optimistically, international agencies might
play a role as commitment devices to permit the implementation of reforms with
lower transition costs. The perspective of the approval of the NAFTA agreement,
for instance, might have played the role of a commitment device in the case of
Mexico, allowing the government more ﬂexibility in choosing the pace of reform.
The model intends to portray the case of a country in a political deadlock
about speciﬁc reform proposals that hurt strong organized interests. It predicts
that, in such cases, under more or less “democratic” conditions, only far reaching
reforms accompanied by major political realignments have hope of success. Wei
(1992) constructs a case (with ex-ante uncertainty and majority voting) where a
gradualist approach is more sustainable. Clearly, a more general model is needed
in order to identify the conditions under which diﬀerent sequencing strategies are
optimal in a politico-economic sense.
46Figure 3.1: The game of reform
47Chapter 4
Reputation and Credit Terms in
New Markets: An Example
4.1 Introduction
Liberalizing economic reform entails, almost by deﬁnition, the creation of new
markets and the deregulation of already operating markets. One clear example
are ﬁnancial markets, which are typically heavily regulated and so are bounded to
experience drastic changes in the regulatory environment as a result of liberaliza-
tion. Imperfect information problems are likely to be pervasive after deregulation
because economic agents have had little or no time to accumulate experience and
observations about each other. The main point of this chapter is to show that
at least some of the diﬃculties associated with liberalization are due to the per-
vasiveness of information problems such as adverse selection and moral hazard.
At the same time, this chapter intends to show how the existence of mechanisms
such as reputation building can allow free markets to overcome these diﬃculties
as time goes on.
I have concentrated on a loan market to provide an example of that larger
point. In many occasions the immediate consequences of ﬁnancial liberalization
have been extremely high interest rates, a number of business failures and even
48ﬁnancial collapse. Diaz-Alejandro (1985) contains a vivid account of the pit-
falls of ﬁnancial reform in Latin America in the late 1970s and early 1980s. In
a less dramatic form, some of these diﬃculties have reemerged in more recent
episodes. Policy mistakes in the early phases of liberalization have usually carried
the blame as sources of trouble (Diaz Alejandro 1985, McKinnon 1991). This
chapter intends to show that there is a sound microeconomic explanation for at
least some of the diﬃculties associated with the opening of new loan markets.
Imperfect information about the pool of borrowers (which is likely to be high in
new credit markets), combined with the lack of eﬀective monitoring technologies,
are part of this explanation. These elements are indeed present in the current
credit crunch in liberalizing Eastern European economies: “Most banks are not
prepared to deal with private costumers, since they have dealing only with state
enterprises all this time. The private business have no track records or experience,
and the presentation of their product is usually primitive” (Raphael 1993).
The model presented here relates to Sobel (1985) and Diamond’s (1989) work
on reputation acquisition. Adverse selection problems are likely to be strong after
a liberalization: Among borrowers (potential investors) which are observation-
ally equivalent, there could be many which only have access to excessively risky
projects (“bad” borrowers), so that they have a high probability of defaulting .
High interest rates will be required to guarantee a competitive return to lenders. If
borrowers are patient enough, those of them who have access to sound investment
projects (“normal” borrowers) will avoid undertaking excessively risky projects in
order to keep their access to the loan market in the future. If borrowers are not pa-
tient enough, credit limits (limits to the amount lent to each individual borrower)
will serve to reduce the gains of choosing excessively risky projects in the present,
in relation to the value of staying in the market, in which the amount lent is ex-
49pected to increase and interest rates are expected to decline. Lower interest rates
obtain as borrowers who default are recognized as the bad ones and excluded from
future lending. While in Diamond’s (1989) model normal borrowers select sound
projects only after interest rates become low enough, here they do so from the
opening of the market. The key diﬀerence is that I allow projects to be divisible,
so that it is possible to realize investments of diﬀerent sizes. Other diﬀerence is
that, for simplicity, I use an inﬁnite horizon and hence do not require the existence
of a group of “honest” borrowers (always committed to choose sound projects)
to sustain the equilibrium. Reputation here simply means the probability of a
borrower not being a bad one.
A feature of the example is that, in equilibrium, the interest rate depends
purely on adverse selection considerations (the probability of a borrower being
bad), while credit limitations are a result of moral hazard (the need to provide
incentives for the borrowers to repay). Credit limits are a substitute for patience:
If the borrowers’ discount rate approaches one, credit limitations become less re-
strictive. Impatience can result for instance, from political instability and the
threat of closing ﬁnancial markets. Under these conditions, credit limits are an
optimum mechanism to counteract moral hazard. The one-period version of the
model is similar to Stiglitz and Weiss (1981); however, in Stiglitz and Weiss lenders
are scarce and credit rationing as discrimination among observationally equivalent
borrowers emerges because lenders cannot raise the rate of interest without exac-
erbating adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Here borrowers are scarce,
and there is no discrimination among them if they are observationally equiva-
lent. The assumption that borrowers are scarce would be valid, for instance, in a
small economy with private access to international capital markets which is a net
receiver of capital.
50As time goes on, the pool of borrowers gets rid of intrinsically bad borrowers,
the number of defaulters decreases, and the interest rate goes down. Or, in the
small economy interpretation, the risk premium paid by domestic ﬁrms over the
international risk-free interest rate goes down. Since smaller rates of interest
mean higher proﬁts, this increases the beneﬁts for the borrowing ﬁrms of keeping
a reputation and, therefore, larger loans are made to individual ﬁrms. As in
Sobel (1985), then, the stakes of cooperative behavior increase over time, and
higher stakes (larger loans) are oﬀered when lenders can be sure that the other
party is interested in cooperation. Hence, this is an extension of Sobel’s loan
model to a market setting, in the sense that the interest rate is not exogenously
given. The upward sloping tilt of the ﬁrm’s proﬁt over time provides a penalty
for cheating, much as in the eﬃciency wage literature an upward tilt in the age-
earning proﬁle is useful to deter workers from cheating. (See Lazear 1981 and
the introduction to Akerlof and Yellen 1986.) This relates to the more general
point this chapter intends to illustrate: Similar mechanisms must be operating in
diﬀerent new markets in which agent speciﬁc information is important.
The picture that emerges from the model is one of a gradual improvement
of credit conditions due to reputation building as the market’s self- correcting
mechanism. This spontaneous evolution, however, will be hindered if adverse
selection is so severe that interest rates attractive to lenders are excessively high
for normal borrowers.
Clearly, models of asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders, or,
in general, between borrowers and sellers, give us only part of the story behind the
diﬃculties associated with liberalization programs. A good deal of the diﬃculties
can also be associated to imperfect credibility of the policymakers and also to
plain policy mistakes along the reform path. But beginning to understand the
51problems introduced by asymmetric information can help to design better policies
for the transition period.
Sections 4.2 and 4.3 present with the model. Section 4.4 deals with possible
extensions. Section 4.5 oﬀers concluding remarks.
4.2 The model
There is an inﬁnite sequence of dates indexed by t = 0,1,.... There are two
diﬀerent sets of players: lenders and borrowers (or ﬁrms). Borrowers are relatively
scarce. (To be formal, there is a continuum of agents distributed over the interval
[0,1] with Lebesgue measure λ. Let S be the set of j ∈ [0,1] that are borrowers,
then
R
Sdλ(j) < 1/2 −  for some  > 0.) Lenders are born each period with
an endowment of 1 unit of input and a constant returns to scale technology that
yields r units of the consumption good at the end of the period. Lenders survive
only one period.
Borrowers receive no endowment, but have access to investment projects each
period. There are two types of projects: “safe” (or “good”) and “risky” (or “bad”).
Safe projects have a return of min [Gy,G], where y is the amount invested and
G > r. Risky projects obtain By with probability π and 0 with probability 1−π.
It is assumed that B > G but πB < r. Borrowers can operate only one project
per period. There are two types of borrowers: “Normal” borrowers have their
choice of project each period, while “bad” borrowers have access only to risky
projects. Borrowers are inﬁnitely-lived. All agents are risk-neutral and have a
discount factor of β ∈ (0,1).
Firms must borrow from lenders to ﬁnance investment. Each borrower’s type
is private knowledge. In addition, the return on a project is private information.
Lenders, however, can commit to use a liquidation technology that destroys the
52output of a ﬁrm if she defaults. The contracts between borrowers and sellers are
assumed to be debt contracts. (Townsend (1979) shows that debt contracts are
optimal in single-period principal-agent environments with similar information
asymmetries.) A contract will be a pair (Rt,Lt), specifying the amount to be
borrowed by a ﬁrm or loan size at time t (Lt) and the amount to be repaid at the
end of time t (LtRt). We will call Rt the interest rate at time t. At the beginning
of each period, a borrower oﬀers a debt contract to a lender. (Actually, who oﬀers
the contracts is immaterial. Since borrowers are on the short side of the market,
they will appropriate all expected rents.) The lender will decide whether to take
it or leave it. If he does not accept it, the borrower can oﬀer the same contract to
other lender. If the lender accepts it, he will proceed to lend Lt units of the input
to the borrower. At the end of the period, borrowers will proceed to repay LtRt
units of output (keeping any remaining return from the investment project chosen
by them); those who don’t will be subject to the liquidation technology in which
case borrowers and lenders involved end up with 0 units of output. Lenders will
make use of their storing technology to obtain r units of output from whatever
units of input have not being lent.
The population of borrowers have a fraction p0 of the normal type. (Or,
being N the set of j ∈ [0,1] that are normal borrowers,
R
N dλ(j) = p0
R
S dλ(j).)
Each borrower’s history of defaults becomes common knowledge. This information
allows lenders to update their beliefs about each borrower’s type.
Some remarks about the assumptions are in order. Linear returns to invest-
ment in both types of projects have been assumed for simplicity and could clearly
be dropped in favor of a more general form. McKinnon’s (1973) insistence on
the importance of increasing returns at the level of individual ﬁrms in developing
countries could be easily accommodated.
53In the model it is assumed that, when behaving honestly, ﬁrms only undertake
projects that entail no risk. Thus, the only function of ﬁnancial markets in the
model is to channel resources from the agents who wish to save to the agents with
productive opportunities. In the real world, of course, main functions of ﬁnancial
markets are risk sharing and risk spreading. Hence, it is interesting to ask what
happens if a richer menu of investment projects is allowed; in particular, what
happens when the project with the highest mean return involves some risk. This
extension will be considered in more detail later.
Finally, the assumption that borrowers are long-lived but lenders live only one
period is intended to focus the attention on borrowers’ reputation as the only
link between the present and the future. Really what the assumption does is to
point at the impossibility of signing multi-period contracts between borrowers and
lenders due to the lack of a commitment technology beyond the simple liquidation
technology mentioned earlier. The role of reputation is also magniﬁed by the
absence of possibilities of collaterizing the loans in the economy described by
the model. More secure property rights allowing for collaterization and a safer
legal environment allowing for more complex contracts are likely to reduce the
importance of the reputation mechanism. Other kinds of “collateral” such as
family links are going to be important in the meantime.
4.3 Competitive equilibrium
Since they are in the short side of the market, borrowers will oﬀer contracts that
maximize their (expected) utility subject to the restriction that the contract terms
are acceptable for lenders.1 Since they are risk neutral, lenders born at time t will
1Besides the equilibrium we are about to describe, there are other sequential equilibria for
the model. If lenders expect normal borrowers to oﬀer contracts that are suboptimal for them,
borrowers will have to validate these expectations in order to avoid being identiﬁed as bad
borrowers. These (unreasonable) equilibria are disposed of by the intuitive criterion of Cho and
54accept any contract terms such that:
r ≥ Rt[pt(1 − d
N
t ) + (1 − pt)(1 − d
B
t )]. (4.1)
The RHS represent the expected payoﬀ of lending one unit of input; the term
in brackets is the probability that the loan will be repaid. The terms dN
t and dB
t
represent the probabilities with which normal and bad borrowers, respectively,
will default, and pt is the probability of a borrower being normal. Bad borrowers
can only undertake risky projects; hence, for any Rt ∈ (0,B], they will default
with probability 1−π. Since the maximum interest rate they could credibly oﬀer
is B and πB is smaller than r, bad borrowers will not want to be identiﬁed as
such and hence in equilibrium they will oﬀer the same contract terms that normal
borrowers oﬀer.
Normal borrowers cannot credibly oﬀer to repay any Rt larger than G. If
normal borrowers undertake risky projects, dN
t = 1−π, and the RHS of equation
(4.1) becomes smaller than r (because πG < πB < r), so the market cannot open.
Hence, in equilibrium, normal borrowers must be at least indiﬀerent between
choosing safe projects or choosing risky ones. If normal borrowers choose safe
projects, dN
t = 0, and anybody defaulting will be identiﬁed as a bad borrower and
excluded from credit thereafter. Thus, the condition for choosing safe projects, in
terms of the value function, is:
V (pt) = Lt(G − Rt) + βV (pt+1) ≥ π(Lt(B − Rt) + βV (pt+1)). (4.2)
An equilibrium consists of loan sizes Lt = L(pt) and interest rates Rt = R(pt) such
that V (pt) is maximized under the constrains (4.1) and (4.2) for dB
t = 1 − π and
dN
t = 0, and reputation pt (the state variable) is updated by Bayes’ Rule. The pro-
gram just described maximizes the utility of normal borrowers (
P∞
t=0 Lt(G−Rt))
Kreps (1987) or the strong communication proof criterion of Riley (Hirshleifer and Riley 1992).
55under the constraints, according to Bellman’s Principle of Optimality. (Bellman’s
Principle of Optimality applies because Lt(G − Rt) is bounded and β ∈ (0,1).)
The following propositions use equations 4.1 and 4.2 to characterize the equi-
librium. If the market opens, equilibrium interest rates will be initially high but
declining. Credit limits will loosen over time, and will no longer be binding after
the interest rate becomes lower than some threshold value ˜ R. (That is, Lt < 1
for Rt > ˜ R and Lt = 1 for Rt ≤ ˜ R.) As time goes by, the number of defaults
will decline, and the interest rate will approach asymptotically from above the
default-free competitive rate r. Firms will undertake larger projects as time goes
on. In we interpret the model as a small, open, liberalizing economy, then what
the model predicts is that new ﬁrms in need of building a reputation to gain access
to loan markets will be initially severely ﬁnance constrained and will face active
interest rates with severely high risk premia. Both problems will lose importance
as time goes on if required interest rates for the lenders to lend are not impossible
to repay for borrowers. Of course, if we have diﬀerent ﬁrms which are not obser-
vationally equivalent, they will face diﬀerent credit conditions, and it would be
entirely possible that credit for some groups of ﬁrms which are potentially viable
as good creditors will remain closed as credit for other groups of ﬁrms improves
over time.
Proposition 4.1 In equilibrium, lenders will only accept contracts from borrow-
ers who have never defaulted. Normal borrowers will always undertake safe projects.
Equilibrium interest rate will be given by:
Rt =
r
pt + π(1 − pt)
. (4.3)
If the market opens at period t (Lt > 0) then:
pt+1 =
pt
pt + π(1 − pt)
. (4.4)
56Proof: The behavior of agents follows from the previous discussion. It is clear
that Rt as given above is the minimum interest rate compatible with equation
(4.1), and a lower interest rate increases more the RHS than the LHS of the
inequality in (4.2). Equation (4.4) is obvious given the equilibrium strategies.
There is a one-to-one relationship between pt and Rt. Hence, we can take Rt
as the state variable. Notice also that Rt is strictly declining and approaches r
from above as long as the market remains open. From (4.3) and (4.4), it is clear
that, given Rt, the entire sequence {Rt+i}
∞












i(Rt+i | Rt = ˜ R). (4.5)
This will be, as shown below, the maximum interest rate at which normal
borrowers will have an incentive to undertake safe projects even if they receive






















i(Rt+i | Rt = ˜ R)
) > 0.
That is, if borrowers are more patient, they will be willing to undertake sound
projects at a higher interest rate.
Proposition 4.2 Equilibrium loan sizes are given by:
Lt =

    
    




if G ≥ Rt > ˜ R > r
1 otherwise.
(4.6)
57Where V (Rt), the value function for the normal borrower, is given by:
V (Rt) =

      
      


















Proof: If the interest rate is higher than G, no lending should occur because
normal borrowers undertaking safe projects will not be able to repay. Then,
Lt = 0. But then, since there is no updating of beliefs, Lt+i = 1, i = 0,1,... and
Vt = 0. This gives a (partial) explanation of the ﬁrst line of equations (4.6) and
(4.7).
From the equality in equation (4.2), the maximum possible value for V (Rt)
obtains by setting Lt+i = 1 for i = 0,1,...:








If the interest rate is smaller than ˜ R, the inequality in equation (4.2) will be
satisﬁed for V (Rt+i) = ¯ V (Rt+i) for i = 0,1,.... Then, as long as it is proﬁtable
for lenders to lend (G ≥ Rt), V (Rt) = ¯ V (Rt) and Lt = 1. This gives us the third
line of equations (4.6) and (4.7).
Otherwise, the borrowers will ask for the largest loan compatible with equation
(4.2). From the inequality in equation (4.2), this loan is: βV (Rt+1)/(Rt − G−πB
1−π ).
This gives us the second line of equation (4.6). The second line of equation (4.7)
follows from substituting this value for Lt in the equality in (4.2).
It remains to be argued that, if ˜ R ≤ r, then the market will not open. It is
easier to proceed by contradiction. Suppose the market opens and ˜ R ≤ r. Then,
Rt will get arbitrarily close to r without ever reaching ˜ R. This means that the
market will always be constrained, even if adverse selection vanish. Borrowers will
58choose safe projects each period only because they expect an ever increasing loan
(as in a bubble). But since Lt is bounded by one, this is impossible.
Finally, the next result is also useful:
Proposition 4.3 If the market opens,
i) Vt+1 is a strictly decreasing function of Rt, and
ii) Lt is a strictly decreasing function of Rt as long as Rt > ˜ R.








This expression is strictly increasing in Vt+1 and strictly decreasing in Rt. From
(i), it follows that Lt must be strictly decreasing in Rt.
It is convenient to summarize the results:
• The market will not open if there is too much adverse selection (G < Rt),
or if borrowers are so impatient that they would only chose safe projects at
a rate of interest below the competitive rate ( ˜ R < r).
• If the market opens, interest rates will be initially high, due to adverse
selection (a large expected proportion of defaults). As bad borrowers incur
in default, they are identiﬁed as such, and the remaining pool of borrowers
confronts declining interest rates.
• If normal borrowers are not patient enough to undertake safe projects when
oﬀered full-size loans, because interest rates are high for the time being
(Rt > ˜ Rt), borrowing limits (Lt < 1) will serve as a way to reduce the gains
of defaulting. Borrowing limits will be relaxed over time until they are no
longer binding (Lt = 1).
59• More patient borrowers (higher β) will confront less restrictive borrowing
limitations (higher Lt) and a sooner end to these limitations (lower ˜ R).
4.4 Discussion
Proposition 4.1 has a strong (and unrealistic) implication: Once Rt is known,
the entire sequence {Rt+i}∞
i=0 is known. This follows from the assumption that
agents know very precisely the riskiness of bad borrowers and the fraction of
the borrowers’ population constituted by bad borrowers. It is more reasonable
to allow agents to observe πt very imperfectly, if at all, and to have imprecise
prior beliefs about the initial contingent of bad borrowers. If agents expect to
learn about aggregate variables in the future, the interest rate will no longer
follow a deterministic process. In fact, with some modiﬁcations, Propositions 4.2
and 4.3 can go through if R follows a supermartingale process, i.e. a stochastic
process satisfying Et(Rt+1 | =t) < Rt, where =t is the information set about
aggregate conditions at time t. (In equations (4.5) to (4.7), it is necessary to
introduce the expectation operator before V (Rt+1) and
P∞
i=0 βiRt+i, and condition
the expectation on the information set =t. ˜ R may no longer be a constant.)
An interesting question to ask is what happens if a richer menu of investment
projects is allowed. In particular, if the project with the highest mean return
involves some risk, it is possible that in equilibrium normal borrowers default. In
this case, it seems likely to have an equilibrium with excusable default. In such
an equilibrium, the probability of each ﬁrm being a normal borrower (its credit
rating) will be updated according to its past record of defaults; in turn, credit
ratings will aﬀect the interest rates that diﬀerent borrowers can oﬀer to lenders.
(Eaton (1990) oﬀers a similar result in two-period model of international debt.)
Too low a credit rating will lead to a permanent exclusion from the credit market.
60The diﬀerence with the previous section is that a normal borrower could end up
being excluded from credit with positive probability.
Introducing diﬀerent types of borrowers may open interesting possibilities.
(For instance, an agent could enter the market as a borrower only with the in-
tention of building a good reputation.) As mentioned earlier, “honest” borrowers
(ﬁrms who always choose safe projects) could also be introduced; this would re-
duce interest rates and would increase loan sizes in equilibrium. In a ﬁnite horizon
version of the model, a positive fraction of honest borrowers would be required to
sustain any lending, as in Diamond’s (1989) work, itself based on Kreps-Wilson’s
(1982) analysis of the reputation paradox.
The approach followed thus far has been to try to describe the equilibrium
path very precisely. As diﬀerent borrowers’ types are allowed, and the menu
of projects increases, the calculation of the equilibrium (or the equilibrium set)
becomes more complex. In more complex situations, the Fudenberg-Levine (1989,
1992) approach becomes useful because it allows to calculate bounds of the long
run player’s payoﬀ (the borrower’s payoﬀ) that hold uniformly over all the Nash
equilibria of the game.
4.5 Concluding remarks
To represent some of the diﬃculties surrounding the process of opening credit
markets, this paper develops a simple model in which trust between lenders and
borrowers is slow to develop, and the stakes oﬀered in each round of transactions
rise accordingly over time. In a process of transition to a market economy, there
may well be many other markets and institutions whose working is to some extent
impaired by the need of acquiring more information about potential partners. The
accumulation of information capital is likely to be costly. (In the example pre-
61sented, it requires to accept a large number of defaults when the market opens.)
To some extent, these costs can be part of the explanation of tendencies lead-
ing towards output decline following large-scale economic reform. Atkinson and
Kehoe (1993) have built a model in which initial output decline results from the
accumulation of other form of information capital, namely, information about new
technologies of production.
Clearly, models of asymmetric information between borrowers and sellers give
us only part of the story behind the diﬃculties associated with ﬁnancial liberaliza-
tion. They can help to explain high interest rates, widespread initial defaults, and
scarcity of working capital; but they can hardly explain other factors conducting
to crises in recently liberalized markets, like the liberality with which banks lent to
some economic groups in Latin American experiences in the 1970’s or the extent
of inter-enterprise credit in Eastern Europe. Implicit government insurance seems
a salient explanation for the latter. This leads us back to the other part of the
story: Explicit or tacit government interventions. As Calvo and Frenkel (1991) re-
mind us, politicians involved in liberalization processes have short track records,
too. Government’s credibility problems are likely to enhance the diﬃculties of
new credit markets, since political instability introduces more risk and lowers the
agents’ regard for the future. An understanding of the forces that govern policy
making is necessary to understand each episode; focusing exclusively on the dif-
ﬁculties created by the credit market itself is a ﬁrst step. A similar observation
may extend to problems arising in other markets.
62Bibliography
[1] Aghion, Philippe and Olivier Blanchard (1993), “On the Speed of Transition
in Central Europe,” mimeo, MIT.
[2] Alesina, Alberto and Allan Drazen (1991), “Why are Stabilizations De-
layed?,” American Economic Review, 81, 1170-1188.
[3] Atkeson, Andrew and Patrick Kehoe (1993), “Industry Evolution and Tran-
sition: The Role of Information Capital,” mimeo.
[4] Bates, Robert (1990), “Macropolitical Economy in the Field of Develop-
ment,” in James Alt and Kenneth Shepsle, editors, Perspectives on Political
Economy, Cambridge University Press.
[5] Bliss, Christopher and Barry Nalebuﬀ (1984), “Dragon- Slaying and Ball-
room Dancing: The Private Supply of a Public Good,” Journal of Public
Economics, 23, 1-12.
[6] Bruno, Michael, Stanley Fischer, Elhanan Helpman and Nissian Liviatan with
L. Meridor, eds., (1991), Lessons of Economic Stabilization and its Aftermath,
MIT Press.
[7] Buchanan, James (1991), “Achieving Economic Reform,” chapter 9 in James
Buchanan, The Economics and the Ethics of Constitutional Order, The Uni-
versity of Michigan Press.
63[8] Calvo, Guillermo (1989), “Incredible Reforms,” in Guillermo Calvo et al.,
editors, Debt, Stabilization and Development: Essays in Memory of Carlos
Diaz Alejandro, Basil Blackwell.
[9] Calvo, Guillermo and Jacob Frenkel (1991), “Credit Markets, Credibility, and
Economic Transformation,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 4, 139-148.
[10] Cho, In-Koo and David Kreps (1987), “Signalling Games and Stable Equi-
libria,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102, 179-222.
[11] Corbo, Vittorio, and Jaime de Melo, editors, (1985), “Liberalization with
Stabilization in the Southern Cone of Latin America,” World Development,
August.
[12] Corbo, Vittorio and Stanley Fischer (1990), “Adjustment Programs and Bank
Support: Rationale and Main Results,” The World Bank, mimeo.
[13] Dewatripont, Mathias and G. Roland (1992), “Economic Reform and Dy-
namic Political Constraints,” Review of Economic Studies, 59, 703-730.
[14] Diamond, Douglas (1989), “Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets,” Jour-
nal of Political Economy, 4, 828-862.
[15] Diaz Alejandro, Carlos (1985), “Good Bye Financial Repression, Hello Fi-
nancial Crash,” Journal of Development Economics, 19, 1- 24.
[16] Dornbusch, Rudiger (1991), “Credibility and Stabilization,” Quarterly Jour-
nal of Economics, 106, 837-850.
[17] Douglas, Roger (1990), “The Politics of Successful Structural Reform,” The
Wall Street Journal, January 17.
64[18] Drazen, Allan and Vittorio Grilli (1993), “The Beneﬁts of Crises for Economic
Reforms,” American Economic Review, 83, 598- 607.
[19] Eaton, Jonathan (1990), “Sovereign Debt, Reputation, and Credit Terms,”
NBER Working Paper #3424.
[20] Edwards, Sebastian and Alejandra Cox-Edwards (1987), Monetarism and
Liberalization: The Chilean Experiment, Ballinger Publishing Co.
[21] Edwards, Sebastian (1992), “Sequencing and Welfare: Labor Markets and
Agriculture,” NBER Working Paper #4095.
[22] Edwards, Sebastian and Sweder van Wijnbergen (1986), “Welfare Eﬀects of
Trade and Capital Market Liberalization: Consequences of Diﬀerent Sequenc-
ing Scenarios,” International Economic Review, February.
[23] Fernandez, Raquel and Dani Rodrik (1992), “Resistance to Reform: Sta-
tus Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Speciﬁc Uncertainty,” American
Economic Review, 81, 1146-1155.
[24] Findlay, Ronald (1990), “The New Political Economy: Its Explanatory Power
for LDCs,” Economics and Politics, 2, 193-221.
[25] Frieden, Jeﬀrey (1991), Debt, Development and Democracy: Modern Political
Economy and Latin America, 1965 - 1985, Westview.
[26] Fudenberg, Drew and David Levine (1989), “Reputation and Equilibrium
Selection in Games with a Patient Player,” Econometrica, 57, 759-778.
[27] Fudenberg, Drew and David Levine (1992), “Maintaining a Reputation when
Strategies are Imperfectly Observed,” Review of Economic Studies, 59, 561-
579.
65[28] Fudenberg, Drew and Jean Tirole (1986), “A Theory of Exit in Duopoly,”
Econometrica, 54, 943-960.
[29] Fudenberg, Drew and Jean Tirole (1991), Game Theory, MIT Press.
[30] Gavin, Michael (1993), “Unemployment and the Economics of Gradualist
Policy Reform,” mimeo, Columbia University, June.
[31] Gonzales de Olarte, Efrain (1991), El P´ endulo Peruano, Instituto de Estudios
Peruanos.
[32] Guidotti, Pablo and Carlos Vegh (1991), “Losing Credibility: The Stabiliza-
tion Blues,” mimeo, IMF Research Department, August.
[33] Haggard, Stephan and Robert Kaufman (1992), “The Political Economy of
Inﬂation and Stabilization in Middle-Income Countries,” in Stephan Haggard
and Robert Kaufman, eds., The Politics of Economic Adjustment, Princeton.
[34] Hillman, Arye and John Riley (1989), “Politically Contestable Rents and
Transfers,” Economics & Politics, 1, 17-39.
[35] Hirshleifer, Jack (1989), “Conﬂict and Rent-Seeking Success Functions: Ratio
vs Diﬀerence Models of Relative Success,” Public Choice, 63, 101-112.
[36] Hirshleifer, Jack and John Riley (1991), The Analytics of Information and
Uncertainty, Cambridge.
[37] Hirschman, Albert (1985), “Reﬂections on the Latin America Experience,”
in Leon Lindberg and Charles Maier, eds., The Politics of Inﬂation and Stag-
nation, Brookings.
[38] Kennan, John and Robert Wilson (1993), “Bargaining with Private Informa-
tion,” Journal of Economic Literature, 31, 45-104.
66[39] Kreps, David and Robert Wilson (1982), “Reputation and Imperfect Infor-
mation,” Journal of Economic Theory, 50, 253-179.
[40] Krueger, Anne (1992), Economic Policy Reform in Developing Countries,
Blackwell.
[41] Laban, Raul and Federico Sturzenegger (1992), “Distributional Conﬂict, Fi-
nancial Adaptation and Delayed Stabilization,” mimeo, UCLA, July.
[42] Lal, Dipak (1987), “The Political Economy of Economic Liberalization,” The
World Bank Economic Review, January, 273-299.
[43] Lazear, Edward (1981), “Agency, Earnings Proﬁles, Productivity, and Hours
Restrictions,” American Economic Review, 71,606-620.
[44] Magee, Stephen, William Brock, and Leslie Young (1989), Black Hole Tariﬀs
and Endogenous Policy Theory, Cambridge University Press.
[45] Maynard Smith, John (1982), Evolution and the Theory of Games, Cam-
bridge University Press.
[46] McKinnon, Ronald (1973), Money and Capital in Economic Development,
Brookings Institution.
[47] McKinnon, Ronald (1991), The Order of Economic Liberalization: Financial
Control in the Transition to a Market Economy, Johns Hopkins.
[48] Mondino, Guillermo, Federico Sturzenegger and Mariano Tommasi (1992),
“Recurrent Inﬂation and Stabilization,” mimeo, UCLA, August.
[49] Mussa, Michael (1982), “Government Policy and the Adjustment Process,”
in Jagdish Bhagwati, ed., Import Competition and Response, University of
Chicago Press.
67[50] Nalebuﬀ, Barry and John Riley (1985), “Asymmetric Equilibria in the War
of Attrition,” Journal of Theoretical Biology, 113, 517-527.
[51] Paredes, Carlos (1991), “Epilogue: In the Aftermath of Hyperinﬂation,” in
Carlos Paredes and Jeﬀrey Sachs, editors, Peru’s Path to Recovery: A Plan
for Economic Stabilization and Growth, Brookings.
[52] Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini (1990), Macroeconomic Policy, Credi-
bility and Institutions, Harwood.
[53] Przeworski, Adam (1991), Democracy and the Market: Political and Eco-
nomic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America, Cambridge University
Press.
[54] Przeworski, Adam (1993), “Economic Reforms, Public Opinion and Political
Institutions: Poland in the Eastern European Perspective,” in L. Bresser, J.
Maravall and A. Przeworski, Economic Reforms in New Democracies, Cam-
bridge.
[55] Raphael, Therese (1993), “End Poland’s World Class Credit Crunch,” Wall
Street Journal, March 9.
[56] Rodrik, Dani (1989), “Credibility of Trade Reform: A Policymaker’s Guide,”
The World Economy, 12, 1-16.
[57] Rodrik, Dani (1989a), “Promises, Promises: Credible Policy Reform via Sig-
nalling,” The Economic Journal, 99, 756-772.
[58] Rodrik, Dani (1992), “The Limits of Trade Policy Reform in Developing
Countries,” The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Winter, 87-105.
68[59] Rodrik, Dani (1993), “The Positive Economics of Policy Reform,” American
Economic Review, 83, 2, 356-361.
[60] Romer, Thomas and Howard Rosenthal (1979), “Bureaucrats versus Voters:
On the Political Economy of Resource Allocation by Direct Democracy,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 93, 563-587.
[61] Sachs, Jeﬀrey (1992), “The Economic Transformation of Eastern Europe:
The Case of Poland,” The American Economist, 36, 2, 3-11.
[62] Sobel, Joel (1985), “A Theory of Credibility,” Review of Economic Studies,
52, 557-573.
[63] Stiglitz, Joseph and Andrew Weiss (1981), “Credit Rationing in Markets with
Imperfect Information,” American Economic Review, 71, 394-410.
[64] Townsend, Robert (1979), “Optimal Contracts and Competitive Markets
with Costly State Veriﬁcation,” Journal of Economic Theory, 21, 265-293.
[65] van Wijnbergen, Sweder (1992), “Intertemporal Speculation, Shortages and
the Political Economy of Price Reforms,” The Economic Journal, 102, 1395-
1406.
[66] Wei, Shang-Jin (1992), “Gradualism versus big Bang: Speed and Sustain-
ability of Reforms,” mimeo, Harvard University.
69